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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (INA) largely gov-
erns the body of law regulating immigration in the United States. 
Provisions of the INA describe classes of noncitizens who are inad-
missible and removable, including any noncitizen who is convicted of 
an aggravated felony defined by the statute. The definition of “aggra-
vated felony” encompasses a range of offenses from very serious to 
relatively minor offenses and imposes harsh consequences for a 
noncitizen convicted of qualifying crimes. Some recent U.S. Supreme 
Court decisions acknowledge the harshness of these consequences 
and are encouraging a more narrow reach for this term, setting the 
stage for Congress to revisit the aggravated felony definition.  
 This Note will suggest restructuring the INA so that its penal 
provisions produce just results for noncitizens convicted of aggravat-
ed felonies. Part II of this Note will consider the legal history of the 
INA, including the expansion of the term aggravated felony, and the 
restriction of judicial and discretionary review by the U.S. Attorney 
General. Part III will characterize judicial interpretation of immigra-
tion laws, consider the recent U.S. Supreme Court decision in 
Moncrieffe v. Holder, and present holdings from the Supreme Court 
and U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals that have collectively shaped im-
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migration law. Part IV will consider the problem with the broad ag-
gravated felony definition and the consequences of characterizing 
crimes as such, including the societal impact that mandatory depor-
tation has on noncitizens and their families. Part IV will also consid-
er whether Moncrieffe v. Holder might open the door for restricting 
the offenses that qualify as aggravated felonies. Part V will consider 
whether the legislature should revise the definition of aggravated 
felony, or whether it should provide more discretionary review to 
determine whether certain offenses warrant removal.   
 This Note does not advocate for the rights of criminal aliens to stay 
in the United States when doing so would threaten the interests of 
justice and the safety of citizens. Rather, it advocates the use of discre-
tion to individually consider immigration offenses before mandating 
removal and the revision of the current statutory scheme, so that mi-
nor offenses are not penalized with disproportionate consequences. 
II.   IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT  
A.   Legal History 
 The primary sources of immigration law are the INA, provisions in 
treaties and other statutes, federal case law, and agency regulations.1 
The goals of this complex body of law include “controlling the entry of 
aliens[;] . . . establishing the grounds and procedures for their expul-
sion or, alternatively, relief from expulsion; providing for administra-
tive and judicial review of the proceedings involved; and creating civil 
and criminal liability as a means of enforcing controls.”2 Imposing 
criminal liability on aliens is among the most serious concerns of the 
federal government, which implemented measures for excluding and 
removing criminal aliens early in the formation of immigration law.3 
Since the nineteenth century, barriers have restricted the entry of 
criminals into the United States; convicts and prostitutes were 
among the first classes of aliens deemed excludable.4 By the early 
twentieth century, Congress enacted statutes that expanded the clas-
ses of excludable aliens and the grounds for removal of aliens who 
were already in the United States.5 
 The Immigration Act of 1917 included, for the first time, a list of 
grounds for removal “in response to public outcry against the activi-
                                                                                                                       
 1. 6 CHARLES GORDON ET AL., IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 1.02[3][a] (Mat-
thew Bender rev. ed. 2013). 
 2. Id. § 1.02[1].  
 3. See id.  
 4. S. REP. NO. 81-1515, at 335 (1950). 
 5. Adriane Meneses, Comment, The Deportation of Lawful Permanent Residents for 
Old and Minor Crimes: Restoring Judicial Review, Ending Retroactivity, and Recognizing 
Deportation as Punishment, 14 SCHOLAR 767, 778 (2012).   
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ties of noncitizen criminals.”6 This Act specifically listed “aliens sen-
tenced to serve one or more years of imprisonment for commission in 
this country within 5 years of entry of crimes involving moral turpi-
tude, or sentenced more than once to such a term of imprisonment for 
the commission of such crimes at any time after entry.”7 Other laws 
mandated removal for aliens convicted of drug trafficking, an offense 
of particular concern to Congress.8 In 1947, the Senate approved a 
resolution allowing for a comprehensive investigation of the immigra-
tion system and subsequently enacted the INA.9 The INA has devel-
oped substantially since 1952 to address changing concerns.10 
B.   Enlargement of the Aggravated Felony Provision 
 In 1988, Congress enacted the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 
(ADAA) to “prevent the manufacturing, distribution, and use of  
illegal drugs, and for other purposes.”11 The ADAA amended the INA 
to include a definition of aggravated felonies to serve as grounds for 
deportation. 12  The ADAA defined three categories of offenses as  
aggravated felonies: murder, drug trafficking, and firearm traffick-
ing.13 After its introduction, the term aggravated felony expanded  
to include more serious and less serious offenses through amend-
ments in the Immigration Act of 1990 (IMMACT 90),14 the Immigra-
tion and Nationality Technical Corrections Act of 1994,15 the Antiter-
rorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1966 (AEDPA),16 and the 
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 
1996 (IIRAIRA).17  
 IMMACT 90 amended the INA to “change the level, and prefer-
ence system for admission, of immigrants to the United States, and 
to provide for administrative naturalization, and for other purpos-
                                                                                                                       
 6. 6 GORDON ET AL., supra note 1, § 71.05[1][a]; see also S. REP. NO. 81-1515, at  
388-89 (discussing the first time an elaborate list of causes for deportation was  
statutorily enumerated). 
 7. S. REP. NO. 81-1515, at 389. 
 8. See id. at 408.  
 9. See id. at 1; see also 6 GORDON ET AL., supra note 1, § 71.05[1][a]. 
 10. 6 GORDON ET AL., supra note 1, § 71.05[1][a]. 
 11. Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181 (codified as amended in scattered titles of  
the U.S. Code). 
 12. § 7342, 102 Stat. at 4469-70 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)).   
 13. Id. 
 14. Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 501(a)(2), 104 Stat. 4978, 5048 (codified as amended at 8 
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)). 
 15. Pub. L. No. 103-416, § 222(a), 108 Stat. 4305, 4320-22 (codified as amended at 8 
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)). 
 16. Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 440(b), 110 Stat. 1214, 1277-78 (codified as amended at 8 
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)). 
 17. Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 321(a), 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-627 to -28 (codified as 
amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)). 
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es.”18 The provision of IMMACT 90 relating to aggravated felonies 
added new categories of crimes to the existing list of qualifying of-
fenses, including illicit trafficking in controlled substances, crimes 
related to money laundering, crimes of violence, and offenses in viola-
tion of federal, state, or foreign law.19 Several years later, the Immi-
gration and Nationality Technical Corrections Act provided the larg-
est expansion of the classes of offenses characterized as aggravated 
felonies to include numerous offenses, such as theft and fraud.20  
 AEDPA and IIRAIRA also impacted the definition of aggravated 
felony. “The four listed purposes of IIRAIRA are to: (1) ‘increase con-
trol over immigration to the United States,’ (2) expedite the removal 
of aliens, ‘especially criminal aliens,’ (3) reduce abuse of asylum and 
parole, and (4) effect a reduction in the use of welfare and govern-
ment benefits by aliens.”21 The purposes of AEDPA are “ ‘to deter 
terrorism, provide justice for victims, provide for an effective death 
penalty, and for other purposes.’ ”22 These Acts modified the aggra-
vated felony definition by lowering the sentencing requirement from 
five years to one year, which allowed the provision to encompass 
crimes characterized as misdemeanors under state law.23 The phrase 
“aggravated felony” is a term of art that includes non-felonies “when 
the language of a particular subparagraph specifically includes mis-
demeanors.”24 “The controlling factor is the sentence imposed,”25 not-
withstanding the fact that Congress expanded the term “conviction” 
to include any reference to imprisonment or sentence, regardless of 
its execution, deferred adjudication, probation, suspension, or ex-
pungement.26 Even an indeterminate sentence constitutes an aggra-
vated felony “as long as the law defines an indeterminate sentence as 
one that exceeds one year.”27 
 Today, the definition of aggravated felony includes more than fifty 
classes of crimes imposing numerous penalties and restrictions 
against convicted noncitizens.28 The legislature expanded the defini-
                                                                                                                       
 18. Immigration Act of 1990. 
 19. Id. § 501 (amending the definition of “aggravated felony” within 8 
U.S.C. § 1101(a)). 
 20. § 222(a), 108 Stat. at 4320-22. 
 21. Meneses, supra note 5, at 825 (quoting S. REP. NO. 104-249, at 2 (1996)). 
 22. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132,  
110 Stat. 1214. 
 23. See Meneses, supra note 5, at 782. 
 24. 6 GORDON ET AL., supra note 1, § 71.05[2][b]. 
 25. Id.  
 26. See Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-
208, § 322(a)(1), 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-628 to -29 (1996) (codified as amended at 8 
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A)-(B)).  
 27. 6 GORDON ET AL., supra note 1, § 71.05[2][b]. 
 28. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (2012); 6 GORDON, supra note 1, § 71.05[2][b]. 
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tion of the term four times in the decade after it was created.29 
Through these amendments, the initial concerns over the serious 
crimes of murder, drug trafficking and firearm trafficking gave way 
to less serious crimes that are neither aggravated, nor felonies.30 
C.   Fitting State Offenses into the Federal Scheme 
 The aggravated felony provision encompasses offenses in violation 
of federal or state law.31 “[W]hether a state conviction can be consid-
ered an aggravated felony for immigration purposes is best deter-
mined according to a uniform rule based on set federal standards.”32 
In most cases, courts employ the categorical approach in determining 
whether a state offense is comparable to an aggravated felony under 
the federal scheme.33 This approach restricts courts to “look only to 
the fact that the defendant had been convicted of crimes falling with-
in certain categories, and not to the facts underlying the prior convic-
tions.”34 Under this approach, courts must determine “whether ‘the 
state statute defining the crime of conviction’ categorically fits within 
the ‘generic’ federal definition of a corresponding aggravated felo-
ny.”35  This approach has been widely accepted in immigration law, 
both because the Attorney General established this standard for con-
victions of noncitizens, and because the Board of Immigration Ap-
peals (BIA) set this as the standard for removal proceedings.36  
 Despite the common usage of the categorical approach, there are 
some immigration cases in which this approach does not achieve the 
best compromise between federal and state offenses. In some in-
stances, a departure from the categorical approach is warranted and 
courts should employ a modified categorical approach. Such cases 
occur, for example, when a noncitizen is convicted of a crime that is 
similar to, but broader than the generic crime, making it uncertain 
whether the offense satisfied the elements of the generic crime.37 Us-
ing the modified categorical approach, courts may go beyond the 
                                                                                                                       
 29. See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. 
No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)); Antiter-
rorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codi-
fied as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)); Immigration and Nationality Technical Correc-
tions Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-416, 108 Stat. 4305 (codified as amended at 8 
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)); Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978 (codi-
fied as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)); Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-
690, 102 Stat. 4181 (codified as amended in scattered titles of the U.S. Code). 
 30. Meneses, supra note 5, at 781. 
 31. § 1101(a)(43). 
 32. 6 GORDON ET AL., supra note 1, § 71.05[2][b]. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. (quoting Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 600 (1990)).  
 35. Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 1678, 1684 (2013) (quoting Gonzales v. Duenas-
Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183, 186 (2007)).  
 36. See id. at 1685; 6 GORDON ET AL., supra note 1, § 71.05[2][b] n.450.1. 
 37. 6 GORDON ET AL., supra note 1, § 71.05[2][b]. 
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statutory language and look into the details of a conviction record to 
determine whether a state offense constitutes an aggravated felony.38  
D.   Restriction of Discretionary Review 
 The changing landscape of immigration law and the expansion of 
the aggravated felony definition have been accompanied by a re-
striction on judicial review in deportation cases. The Immigration Act 
of 1917 created Judicial Recommendation Against Deportation 
(JRAD), giving sentencing judges the ultimate authority to determine 
that a noncitizen shall not be deported.39 Judicial discretion was re-
stricted in 1952 and eliminated in the 1990s.40 IMMACT 90 restricted 
the ability of immigration judges to grant discretionary relief in re-
moval proceedings, which AEDPA entirely eliminated in 1996. 41 
AEDPA added that “any final order of deportation against an alien 
who is deportable by reason of [certain enumerated criminal grounds] 
shall not be subject to review by any court.”42 The limitation on judi-
cial review eliminated any ability of an immigration judge to consider 
a noncitizen’s case and determine that they qualify for some form of 
discretionary relief from removal.  
 The INA does provide several possibilities for waivers of deporta-
tion. For example, a noncitizen may be granted a full and uncondi-
tional pardon by the President of the United States or by the gover-
nor of any state.43 In addition, the INA includes a provision granting 
the Attorney General the discretion to cancel removal of permanent 
residents or certain nonpermanent residents deemed inadmissible or 
deportable; but, such discretion is barred altogether in cases where 
the offender has been convicted of an aggravated felony.44 The effect 
of deportability, the limitation on judicial review of removal, and the 
limited ability of noncitizens to seek cancellation of removal are the 
obstacles that noncitizens face once their misconducts are categorized 
as aggravated felonies.45  
                                                                                                                       
 38. Id.  
 39. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1479 (2010); Meneses, supra note 5, at 782-83.  
 40. Meneses, supra note 5, at 783. 
 41. Id. 
 42. 6 GORDON ET AL., supra note 1, § 104.13[3] (quoting Antiterrorism and Effective 
Death Penalty Act of 1996 § 440(a)). 
 43. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(vi) (2012). 
 44. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a) (2012). 
 45. 6 GORDON ET AL., supra note 1, § 71.05[2][c]. 
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III.   AGGRAVATED FELONY CASES  
A.   Supreme Court Cases Shaping the Law 
 Federal court decisions have shaped the law relating to the  
deportability of criminal aliens as the statutory framework has 
evolved. Numerous decisions from the Supreme Court and circuit 
courts of appeals have involved noncitizens convicted of aggravated 
felonies. In less than a decade, the Supreme Court decided three  
cases involving drug offenses, each analyzing “whether the Govern-
ment has properly characterized a low-level drug offense as ‘illicit 
trafficking in a controlled substance,’ and thus an ‘aggravated felo-
ny.’ ” 46  Additionally, the Court decided one case that considered 
whether a fraud conviction was an aggravated felony. 47  Through 
these decisions, the Court has established precedent that provides 
guidance to lower courts. 
 In 2006, the Court decided Lopez v. Gonzales and determined that 
a noncitizen’s conviction of a state felony ultimately was not an ag-
gravated felony. 48  The defendant was a legal permanent resident 
when he was convicted in South Dakota of a felony charge of aiding 
and abetting the possession of cocaine.49  The INA provides that illicit 
trafficking in a controlled substance, which the CSA makes punisha-
ble by more than one year in prison, is an aggravated felony.50 South 
Dakota law equated the aiding and abetting charge with possession, 
so the defendant was convicted of a felony, which was characterized 
as a misdemeanor under the CSA.51 The government argued that the 
felony conviction should be treated as an aggravated felony under the 
INA, but the Court disagreed.52 It reasoned that Congress would not 
have created a statutory scheme of felonies and misdemeanors if it 
intended courts to ignore the scheme in favor of state punishment.53 
The Court held that a state offense only equates to a federal felony if 
it proscribes conduct punishable as a felony under federal law.54 The 
defendant, therefore, was not disqualified from discretionary cancel-
lation of removal.55  
 Three years later, in Nijhawan v. Holder, a noncitizen was con-
victed of “conspiring to commit mail fraud, wire fraud, bank fraud, 
                                                                                                                       
 46. Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 1678, 1693 (2013). 
 47. See Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29, 32 (2009). 
 48. See Lopez v. Gonzales, 549 U.S. 47, 60 (2006).  
 49. Id. at 51. 
 50. Id. at 50.  
 51. Id. at 53. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 54-55.  
 54. Id. at 60. 
 55. See id.  
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and money laundering.”56  The INA makes punishable as an aggra-
vated felony “an offense that . . . involves fraud or deceit in which the 
loss to the victim . . . exceeds $10,000.”57  The jury made no finding as 
to the amount involved in the fraud convictions, but the defendant 
stipulated at sentencing to an amount exceeding $10,000.58 The Court 
considered whether the amount required for characterization as an 
aggravated felony under the INA referred to “an element of a fraud 
statute or to the factual circumstances surrounding commission of 
the crime on a specific occasion.” 59  This difference would affect 
whether the Court should adopt the typical categorical approach, or 
whether it should adopt a circumstance-specific approach when de-
termining whether the offense constitutes an aggravated felony.60 
Despite the Court’s emphasis that the categorical approach is neces-
sary when considering generic crimes, the Court adopted the circum-
stance-specific approach in this case because of the statutory-
threshold requirement.61  The Court upheld the aggravated felony 
conviction against the defendant, because there was clear and con-
vincing evidence that the conviction involved losses considerably 
greater than the amount required by the statute.62  
 In 2010, the Court decided Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, which 
involved a legal permanent resident who faced deportation after 
committing two misdemeanor drug offenses in Texas.63 The federal 
law provided that “recidivist simple possession”—a repeat conviction 
for a simple possession offense—is punishable as a felony with a 
prison sentence of up to two years, making it an aggravated felony.64 
Because of this categorization, the government sought to deport the 
defendant after his second conviction for possessing a single tablet of 
anti-anxiety medication without a prescription.65 The defendant did 
not contest his removability, but argued he was eligible for cancella-
tion of removal.66 The Court had to determine whether the mere pos-
sibility of a two-year prison sentence was sufficient to constitute an 
aggravated felony.67 The Court used a “commonsense conception” of 
the statutory language and determined that possession of one Xanax 
tablet did not constitute the offense of trafficking in a controlled sub-
                                                                                                                       
 56. 557 U.S. 29, 32 (2009). 
 57. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 58. Id.  
 59. Id. at 33. 
 60. Id. at 34.  
 61. See id. at 36. 
 62. See id. at 42-43. 
 63. 560 U.S. 563 (2010).  
 64. Id. at 567-68. 
 65. Id. at 570. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
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stance.68 The Court held that the relevant statutory hook is an actual 
conviction of a crime punishable as a felony under federal law, not 
the mere possibility that a felony conviction could have resulted.69  
B.   Moncrieffe v. Holder 
 Most recently in 2013, the Court issued its decision in Moncrieffe 
v. Holder, considering for a third time in seven years whether the 
government “properly characterized a low-level drug offense as ‘illicit 
trafficking in a controlled substance,’ and thus an ‘aggravated felo-
ny.’ ”70 The defendant in Moncrieffe was a Jamaican citizen who le-
gally moved to the United States in 1984 when he was three years 
old.71 In 2007, the defendant was arrested for possessing 1.3 grams of 
marijuana and pleaded guilty to possession of marijuana with intent 
to distribute, a felony under Georgia state law.72 As a first-time of-
fender, the trial court required the defendant to complete five years 
of probation for the offense, after which the charge would be ex-
punged.73 In addition, “the trial court withheld entering a judgment 
of conviction or imposing any term of imprisonment.”74  
 The government later sought to deport the defendant for convic-
tion of an aggravated felony, because the offense was punishable by 
up to five years imprisonment and considered a felony under the 
CSA.75 An immigration judge ordered the defendant’s removal, and 
the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed.76 The defendant 
filed a petition for review to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals and 
asserted that § 841(b)(4) of the CSA makes distribution of “a small 
amount of marijuana for no remuneration” a misdemeanor offense.77 
The Fifth Circuit denied the petition, holding that the defendant’s 
conviction under Georgia law was the equivalent of a federal felony, 
and that “ ‘the default sentencing range for a marijuana distribution 
offense is the CSA’s felony provision, § 841(b)(1)(D), rather than the 
misdemeanor provision.’ ”78  
 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the narrow issue 
of whether a state statute criminalizing conduct that meets both fel-
ony and misdemeanor provisions of the CSA is an offense that “ ‘pro-
                                                                                                                       
 68. Id. at 573. 
 69. See id. 
 70. 133 S. Ct. 1678, 1693 (2013). 
 71. Id. at 1683. 
 72. Id.; see also Ga. Code Ann., § 16-13-30(h) (making it a felony to possess a con-
trolled substance with intent to distribute). 
 73. Id.  
 74. Id. 
 75. See id. 
 76. See id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. (quoting Moncrieffe v. Holder, 662 F.3d 387, 392 (5th Cir. 2011), rev’d, 133 S. 
Ct. 1678 (2013) (citing Lopez v. Gonzales, 549 U.S. 47, 392 (2006))). 
1182  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:1173 
 
scribes conduct punishable as a felony under’  the CSA.”79 Under the 
Georgia statute, the defendant pleaded guilty to a felony, but the 
record of conviction did not necessarily establish that the defendant’s 
conduct would constitute a felony under the CSA.80  
 Justice Sotomayor wrote the opinion for the Court and described 
the severity of the consequences for noncitizens convicted of aggra-
vated felonies under the INA, including deportation and ineligibility 
for discretionary relief from removal.81  The Court maintained the 
standard that “a noncitizen’s conviction of an offense that the [CSA] 
makes punishable by more than one year’s imprisonment will be 
counted as an ‘aggravated felony’ ” for convictions under state or fed-
eral law, but state offenses must be punishable as felonies under fed-
eral law.82 The Court employed the categorical approach to determine 
whether the state offense equated to the generic definition of a feder-
al felony,83 explaining:  
By “generic,” we mean the offenses must be viewed in the abstract, 
to see whether the state statute shares the nature of the federal of-
fense that serves as a point of comparison. Accordingly, a state of-
fense is a categorical match with a generic federal offense only if a 
conviction of the state offense “ ‘necessarily’ involved . . . facts 
equating to [the] generic [federal offense].”84 
This approach required the Court to ignore the facts underlying the 
case, assume that the conviction was for the least severe acts crimi-
nalized under the state statute, and then determine whether the 
crime fit the definition of the generic federal offense.85 In cases where 
a state statute contains several different crimes, each described sepa-
rately, “a court may determine which particular offense the nonciti-
zen was convicted of by examining the charging document and jury 
instructions, or in the case of a guilty plea, the plea agreement, plea 
colloquy,” or something similar.86  
 The Court applied the categorical approach in Moncrieffe, because 
“ ‘illicit trafficking in a controlled substance’ is a ‘generic crime.’ ”87 
To satisfy the categorical approach, the state drug offense “must 
‘necessarily’ proscribe conduct that is an offense under the CSA, and 
the CSA must ‘necessarily’ prescribe felony punishment for that con-
duct.”88 The primary issue before the Court was whether the defend-
                                                                                                                       
 79. Id. at 1684 (quoting Lopez, 549 U.S. at 60). 
 80. See id. at 1685. 
 81. See id. at 1682. 
 82. Id. at 1683. 
 83. See id. at 1684. 
 84. Id. (quoting Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 24 (2005)). 
 85. Id. (citing Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133, 137 (2010)). 
 86. See id. (citing Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29, 35 (2009)). 
 87. Id. at 1685 (quoting Nijhawan, 557 U.S. at 37). 
 88. Id. 
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ant’s conviction under Georgia law for possession of marijuana with 
intent to distribute was “necessarily” a felony under the CSA.89 Alt-
hough possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute is 
a felony, the Court was required to consider what punishment the 
CSA imposed for the offense.90  
 Upon examining the punishment provisions within the CSA,  
the Court cited the statute and highlighted its exception.91 Section 
841(a) describes the offense of unlawful possession under which  
the defendant was convicted, and subsection (b) describes its  
respective punishment:  
Subsection (b)(1)(D) provides that if a person commits a violation 
of subsection (a) involving “less than 50 kilograms of marihuana,” 
then “such person shall, except as provided in paragraphs (4) and 
(5) of this subsection, be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 
not more than 5 years,” i.e., as a felon. But one of the exceptions is 
important here. Paragraph (4) provides, “Notwithstanding para-
graph (1)(D) of this subsection, any person who violates subsection 
(a) of this section by distributing a small amount of marihuana for 
no remuneration shall be treated as” a simple drug possessor, 21 
U.S.C. § 844, which for our purposes means as a misdemeanant.92  
 The distinguishing factor in Moncrieffe was that the defendant’s 
conviction fell within the statutory exception that created two catego-
ries of punishment for possession with intent to distribute under the 
CSA, which meant the state conviction could match both felony and 
misdemeanor punishment.93 Under the Georgia statute, a conviction 
for possession with intent to distribute marijuana does not reveal 
whether the conviction is for a small amount or for no remunera-
tion.94 Since a conviction for an aggravated felony requires that the 
state statute describe an offense that is “necessarily” punishable as a 
felony under the CSA, the defendant’s conviction in Moncrieffe was 
not an aggravated felony.95  
 The Fifth Circuit believed the felony provision of the CSA to be 
the default provision,96 but the Court felt this would ignore the legis-
lature’s intent in creating separate punishments within the statute.97 
The Court held that the conviction under state law was not for an 
aggravated felony under the INA.98 The Court made clear its prefer-
                                                                                                                       
 89. See id.  
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. at 1686. 
 92. Id. at 1685-86. 
 93. See id. at 1686. 
 94. See id. 
 95. See id. at 1687. 
 96. Id. at 1688. 
 97. See id. at 1689. 
 98. See id.  
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ence to “err on the side of underinclusiveness because ambiguity in 
criminal statutes referenced by the INA must be construed in the 
noncitizen’s favor.”99 In addition, the Court declared that it would be 
unreasonable to characterize conduct as an aggravated felony when 
that conduct is characterized as a misdemeanor under federal stat-
utes.100 Although the defendant was still subject to deportation for his 
conviction, the Court’s holding eliminated the mandatory sanctions 
that would have been imposed under the INA if the conviction were 
categorized as an aggravated felony.101  
C.   Moncrieffe Dissent 
 Justice Alito dissented in Moncrieffe, claiming that the Court did 
not use a pure categorical approach in deciding the case and assert-
ing a need to depart from the pure categorical approach under the 
specific circumstances.102 Justice Alito presented a hypothetical in 
which an alien found to possess two marijuana cigarettes with the 
intent to give one to a friend would be regarded as having committed 
an aggravated felony under the pure categorical approach.103 “[T]his 
classification is plainly out of step with the CSA’s assessment of the 
severity of the alien’s crime because under the CSA the alien could 
obtain treatment as a misdemeanant.”104 Justice Alito agreed with 
the majority that the alien should not be classified as an aggravated 
felon, but he declared that it is necessary to depart from a pure cate-
gorical approach in order to avoid this result.105 Ultimately, he took 
exception with the Court’s reasoning rather than with its result.106  
 Justice Alito sided with the government’s proposed remedy, which 
provided that noncitizens should be given the opportunity in immi-
gration proceedings to show that their conviction involved a small 
amount of marijuana for no remuneration.107 The majority disagreed 
with this result, asserting that this sort of post hoc investigation 
would invite re-litigation of past convictions in mini-trials, which is 
precisely what the categorical approach aims to prevent.108 As Justice 
Alito pointed out, the categorical approach would not be best in cases 
like Moncrieffe, because some state crimes are so broadly defined 
that they encompass very serious and less serious crimes. Although 
                                                                                                                       
 99. Id. at 1693; see Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 560 U.S. 563, 581 (2010); Leocal v. 
Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 11 n.8 (2004). 
 100. Moncrieffe, 133 S. Ct. at 1693. 
 101. See id.  
 102. See id. at 1699 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. at 1699-1700. 
 105. Id. at 1700. 
 106. See id. 
 107. Id. at 1690 (majority opinion). 
 108. See id.  
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the INA aims to identify categories of criminal conduct that pose a 
particularly high danger to society, its goal is not furthered by cate-
gorizing defendants, like the one in Moncrieffe, as aggravated fel-
ons.109 Justice Alito supported a departure from the categorical ap-
proach, much like the Court embraced in prior cases, and supported a 
kind of modified categorical approach, declaring, “it is appropriate to 
look beyond the elements of the state offense and to rely as well on 
facts that were admitted in state court.”110   
D.   Circuit Court Cases Applying the Law 
 In light of decisions by the Supreme Court, various circuit courts 
have dealt with similar issues involving noncitizens convicted of ag-
gravated felonies. Notable cases show the outer limits reached by the 
aggravated felony provision and the widely accepted rule that mis-
demeanor offenses in state law can constitute aggravated felonies. 
Circuit court decisions show how this definition extends from petit 
larceny, to pointing a firearm at another person, to aggravated crim-
inal sexual contact.111   
 In United States v. Pacheco, the Second Circuit announced: “In the 
case before us, we deal with the question of whether Congress can 
make the word ‘misdemeanor’ mean ‘felony.’ As will be seen, we hold 
that it can.”112 Pacheco involved a noncitizen who was convicted of 
several misdemeanors in Rhode Island for which he received sus-
pended one-year sentences.113 The Second Circuit held that he had 
been convicted of a single, aggravated felony.114 Similarly, in United 
States v. Christopher, the Eleventh Circuit upheld a lower court’s 
finding that the defendant’s misdemeanor shoplifting offense consti-
tuted an aggravated felony, because that court imposed a twelve-
month, albeit suspended, sentence.115  The Eleventh Circuit consid-
ered the length of the sentence imposed to be the controlling factor.116 
Additionally, in United States v. Graham, the Third Circuit upheld a 
lower court’s finding that a petit larceny conviction constituted an 
aggravated felony.117  
                                                                                                                       
 109. See id. (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 110. Id. at 1701. 
 111. See, e.g., Cole v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 712 F.3d 517 (11th Cir. 2013); Restrepo v. Att’y 
Gen., 617 F.3d 787 (3d Cir. 2010); United States v. Graham, 169 F.3d 787 (3d Cir. 1999).  
 112. United States v. Pacheco, 225 F.3d 148, 149 (2d Cir. 2000).  
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. United States v. Christopher, 239 F.3d 1191, 1193-94 (11th Cir. 2001). 
 116. Id. at 1193. 
 117. Graham, 169 F.3d at 793. 
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IV.   THE PROBLEM 
A.   Overbroad Aggravated Felony Provision 
 The laws expanding the aggravated felony definition have a com-
mon goal of protecting U.S. citizens. 118  The initial concern that 
prompted the creation the aggravated felony provision in the INA 
was protection from noncitizens convicted of murder, drug traffick-
ing, and firearm trafficking.119 Subsequent amendments to the INA 
provided protections from noncitizens engaged in crimes of violence, 
theft, and fraud.120 The most recent changes to the statute aimed to 
expedite the removal of criminal aliens, deter terrorism, and provide 
justice for victims.121 These changes serve societal interests by char-
acterizing offenses as aggravated felonies and imposing punishment 
for serious criminal conduct in furtherance of a worthy goal.  
 The expansion of the classes of crimes characterized as aggravated 
felonies, however, begs an inquiry into whether the definition of ag-
gravated felony is overbroad. It may be the case, for example, that 
amidst the growing fear of terrorism, Congress had a growing con-
cern about getting rid of criminal aliens in the United States and 
equated all noncitizens to “terrorist aliens.”122 AEDPA and IIRAIRA, 
which were enacted primarily to deter terrorism, had the largest im-
pact on the aggravated felony definition.123 The concern driving the 
bills could have led Congress to draft an over-inclusive statute in 
response to the perceived problem of having criminal aliens in the 
country. “The aggravated felony provision now appears to include a 
number of crimes that may not seem deserving of their menacing 
label, such as petty theft, perjury, and misdemeanor assault and bat-
                                                                                                                       
 118. See, e.g., Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, 
Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)); 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 
(codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)); Immigration and Nationality Technical 
Corrections Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-416, 108 Stat. 4305 (codified as amended at 8 
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)); Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978 (codi-
fied as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)); Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-
690, 102 Stat. 4181 (codified as amended in scattered titles of the U.S. Code). 
 119. See Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988. 
 120. See Immigration and Nationality Technical Corrections Act of 1994; Immigration 
Act of 1990.  
 121. See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996; Anti-
terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996. 
 122. See Aarti Kohli, Does the Crime Fit the Punishment?: Recent Judicial Actions 
Expanding the Rights of Noncitizens, 2 CAL. L. REV. CIR. 1, 6 (2011). 
 123. See Illegal Immigration and Nationality Technical Corrections Act of 1996; Anti-
terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996; see also Meneses, supra note 5, at 825. 
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tery.”124 The effects of the expansions seem to extend beyond the pur-
poses motivating the amendments.125 
B.   Harsh Consequences for Conviction 
 The INA declares that “[a]ny alien who is convicted of an aggra-
vated felony at any time after admission is deportable.”126 Deportabil-
ity makes it possible for the federal government to initiate removal 
proceedings against a noncitizen, yet in many instances, a noncitizen 
has various remedies to prevent actual removal.  The alien may ap-
ply for a waiver, seek cancellation of removal by the Attorney Gen-
eral, or apply for asylum; but an alien convicted of an aggravated 
felony under the INA is barred from almost all forms of relief.127 The 
only available relief is a full pardon by the President or a state gov-
ernor.128  This provision removes the Attorney General’s discretion 
and states: “The Attorney General may cancel removal in the case of 
an alien who is . . . deportable from the United States if the al-
ien . . . has not been convicted of an aggravated felony.”129 Further-
more, “an alien who has been convicted of an aggravated felony shall 
be considered to have been convicted of a particularly serious crime,” 
meaning the alien is presumed to be a danger to the community of 
the United States and is ineligible to apply for asylum.130 Thus, aliens 
convicted of aggravated felonies are deportable with no reasonable 
forms of relief, which is the practical equivalent of mandatory removal.  
 In addition to mandatory removal, the consequences of requiring 
deportation for an aggravated felony conviction include: (1) mandato-
ry detention during removal proceedings; (2) a permanent bar 
against re-entry into the United States; (3) a bar against naturaliza-
tion; and (4) enhanced sentences for illegal re-entry after deporta-
tion.131 Furthermore, the aggravated felony provision applies retroac-
tively and may have consequences on old convictions.132 These conse-
quences do not solely impact the criminal alien but very often affect 
the alien’s family.133 Human Rights Watch estimates that over 1 mil-
lion people in the United States lost a family member to deportation 
between 1997 and 2007, many of whom are citizen children or spous-
                                                                                                                       
 124. Iris Bennett, The Unconstitutionality of Nonuniform Immigration Consequences of 
“Aggravated Felony” Convictions, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1696, 1699 (1999). 
 125. See Meneses, supra note 5, at 825. 
 126. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (2012). 
 127. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(vi), 1229b(a)(3), 1158(b)(2)(A)-(B) (2012).  
 128. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(vi). 
 129. § 1229b(a)(3). 
 130. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(B)(i) (2012). 
 131. Bennett, supra note 124, at 1701-02.  
 132. Id. at 1702. 
 133. Meneses, supra note 5, at 777. 
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es of noncitizens.134  The restriction on re-entry also tremendously 
impacts aliens with families in the United States by eliminating any 
opportunity to be reunited in this country.135 
 According to estimates by the Department of Homeland Security, 
160,000 convicted criminal aliens were deported in 2010, mostly due 
to convictions for drug offenses, immigration offenses, and criminal 
vehicular-traffic offenses.136 “According to Human Rights Watch, of 
those persons deported for criminal offenses between 1997 and 2007, 
seventy-two percent were deported for committing non-violent 
crimes, and another fourteen percent were deported for offenses that 
had the potential to cause harm but did not.”137 Deportation carries 
serious penal consequences for noncitizens138 and others in the United 
States community.139 Thus, competing concerns for safety of the Amer-
ican people and unity among the families of noncitizens call for careful 
consideration of the impact of expanded laws that may overreach the 
intent of the legislature and impact important societal values.  
C.   Effect of Supreme Court Decisions 
 The fact that the Supreme Court has repeatedly addressed the 
issue of whether a noncitizen’s criminal conduct constitutes an ag-
gravated felony indicates the need for a better understanding of the 
purposes of the INA in order to appropriately implement its provi-
sions. The CSA and the INA, for example, enforce punishment 
against the serious crime of illicit trafficking in a controlled sub-
stance.140 “Large-scale marijuana distribution is a major source of 
income for some of the world’s most dangerous drug cartels.”141 The 
CSA and INA aim to prevent and punish such large-scale drug dis-
tribution, but the goals of these statutes are not to impose serious 
consequences on crimes that are “out of step with the CSA’s assess-
ment of the severity of the alien’s crime[.]”142 Mandating removal 
without judicial review, or without possibility for cancellation of re-
                                                                                                                       
 134. See id.  
 135. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(ii); Bennett, supra note 124, at 1701-02; Meneses, 
supra note 5, at 822; see also Deportations Under ’96 Law Take Toll on Families, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS (July 18, 2007), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/11683008/ns/us_news-
life/t/deportations-under-law-take-toll-families/#.U3lTTV7A2d8. 
 136. Meneses, supra note 5, at 773. 
 137. Id. 
 138. See, e.g., Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010). In Padilla, the Supreme Court 
ruled that defense counsel was required to inform noncitizen defendants of the deportation 
consequences of entering into a plea agreement. Id. at 369. The Court refused to  
distinguish between direct and collateral consequences in the immigration context, recog-
nizing that deportation is an integral part of the penalty that may be imposed on nonciti-
zens. Id. at 366. 
 139. Meneses, supra note 5, at 777. 
 140. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43).   
 141. Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 1678, 1696 (2013) (Alito, J., dissenting).  
 142. See id. at 1699.  
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moval of a noncitizen convicted of possession of a small amount of 
marijuana with intent to distribute, naturally falls beyond the seri-
ous crimes these statutes aim to criminalize.143 For this reason, the 
Court in Moncrieffe determined that “[s]haring a small amount of 
marijuana for no remuneration, let alone possession with intent to do 
so, does not fit easily into the everyday understanding of trafficking, 
which ordinarily . . . means some sort of commercial dealing;” and 
decided that the defendant’s conduct did not warrant the harsh con-
sequences of an aggravated felony conviction. 144  The Court in 
Moncrieffe held for the third time that conduct the BIA and circuit 
courts were willing to uphold as aggravated felonies was not, in fact, 
equivalent to an aggravated felony.145  
 Consistency in applying the law, and clarity about interpreting 
the law, is necessary, especially when the consequences of conviction 
are so harsh. To that end, the recurrence of this issue before the 
Court may be a result of the realization that harsh consequences are 
not warranted by low-level drug offenses, or by less serious offenses 
in general. The consideration of whether an offense falls within the 
scope of an aggravated felony requires a comparison between state 
and federal law.146 “Different states, however, define the requisite 
elements for . . . crimes differently.”147 This creates disparity and in-
consistency as to what constitutes aggravated felonies in different 
states.148 With many offenses qualifying as aggravated felonies while 
falling outside the scope of serious conduct criminalized by the INA, 
the issues before the Court may soon extend to other types of crimi-
nal conduct warranting mandatory removal without review. The 
Court’s recent decisions encourage a legislative revision to restrict 
the types of criminal conduct that can be reached by the INA’s aggra-
vated felony definition or allow more discretion for judges deciding 
the issue.149 
V.   THE SOLUTION 
 The recurring dispute over the definition of aggravated felony be-
fore the Supreme Court suggests a need both to revise this provision 
                                                                                                                       
 143. See id. 
 144. Id. at 1693 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 145. See id.; Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 560 U.S. 563 (2010); Lopez v. Gonzales, 549 
U.S. 47 (2006).  
 146. See 6 GORDON ET AL., supra note 1, § 71.05[2][b]. 
 147. Bennett, supra note 124, at 1720. 
 148. See id. 
 149. Meneses, supra note 5, at 785 (“Recent Supreme Court holdings seem to be calling 
for Congressional re-consideration of immigration laws, especially in areas in which crimi-
nal law intersects with immigration regulation.”); see also Kohli, supra note 122, at 14 
(“[T]he Court seems to be reacting to Congress’ reduction of judicial and administrative 
discretion with regard to deportations of criminal noncitizens over the last twenty years 
and the concurrent sharp increase in removals.”). 
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to prevent excessive punishment for less serious offenses, and to cure 
disparate results in lower courts regarding what crimes constitute 
aggravated felonies. These needs call for congressional restructuring 
of the provisions of the INA defining aggravated felony and eliminat-
ing discretionary review of removal for noncitizens convicted of quali-
fying offenses. Narrowing the definition and granting judges discre-
tion in reviewing immigration cases may be the appropriate solution 
to improve the current, unclear state of immigration law. 
 The term aggravated felony denotes a serious threat to society and 
suggests that removal without relief is proper for such offenses, but 
the Court has agreed that deportation goes beyond being regulatory 
and imposes severe penalties upon a noncitizen.150 There is a very 
real threat to noncitizens, because this provision includes offenses 
ranging from misdemeanors to murder and imposing a blanket sanc-
tion upon anyone convicted of an offense, regardless of its severity.151 
Although U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals have embraced the fact that 
this provision can include misdemeanors,152 the Supreme Court has 
reversed those courts on three occasions, putting an end to deporta-
tion for some less serious crimes. These cases produced rulings that 
share a view of leniency for criminal aliens.153  
 A major issue in all of these Supreme Court decisions was the rea-
sonableness of equating state convictions to federal convictions. Be-
cause state statutes can be very broad, disparity arises when courts 
are required to characterize state laws within the federal system. 
The Court has created many guidelines for courts to consider when 
determining whether offenses qualify as aggravated felonies. In 
Lopez, the circuit court and BIA supported a finding that the state 
felony should warrant removal as an aggravated felony, even though 
the crime of aiding and abetting possession of cocaine only amounted 
to a federal misdemeanor.154 However, the Court held that the state 
offense must proscribe conduct punishable as a federal felony, imply-
ing that a consideration of conduct is essential. 155  In Carachuri-
Rosendo, the Court emphasized that conviction of a crime that is 
punishable as a federal felony is key. 156 These holdings, taken to-
gether, seem to instruct courts to determine whether the actual con-
viction under a state law that prescribes conduct punishable as a 
felony equates to an aggravated felony. In Moncrieffe, the Court de-
cided that a state felony should not be viewed in light of a default 
                                                                                                                       
 150. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 365 (2010). 
 151. See Meneses, supra note 5, at 798. 
 152. See, e.g., United States v. Pacheco, 225 F.3d 148 (2d Cir. 2000).  
 153. See Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 1678 (2013); Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 
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provision when the federal law includes dovetailing provisions pre-
scribing both felony and misdemeanor punishment for an offense.157 
These cases illustrate the complicated manner in which courts must 
consider convictions. Although the Supreme Court found a way to 
reconcile these holdings, this area of the law remains perplexing,  
and judicial discretion may be the best resolution. In the wake of 
broad state statutes and complicated instructions, judicial discretion 
could be a meaningful and effective way of determining which part of 
a law an alien violated, and whether that offense should constitute 
an aggravated felony.  
 Furthermore, Justice Thomas’s dissent in Moncrieffe suggests that 
the issue of aggravated felonies will continue to appear before the 
Court if it keeps ignoring the plain meaning of statutes.158 If there is 
concern about the Supreme Court misinterpreting statutory provi-
sions in its application of this law, it follows that U.S. Circuit Courts 
of Appeals will also have difficulty discerning the law. While it is 
Congress’s prerogative to develop immigration law and policy, it 
would be desirable to revise ambiguous laws in order to promote 
more fair and consistent implementation. However, if Congress de-
cides not to take action and narrow the scope of the aggravated felo-
ny provision, it should at least allow for judicial discretion to cure 
ambiguities. According to long-standing canons of construction, am-
biguous provisions should be viewed in a light favorable to the 
noncitizen.159 Employing this canon would require judges to inquire 
about the relevant circumstances surrounding the criminal convic-
tion while determining whether removal is warranted.  
 The categorical approach is the accepted standard by which to fit 
state offenses in the federal law,160 but the Supreme Court agreed 
that sometimes employment of a modified categorical approach is 
favorable.161 A modified categorical approach may, in fact, be better 
suited than the categorical approach to determine whether most 
criminal convictions are properly characterized as aggravated felo-
nies. While the majority in Moncrieffe supported the use of the cate-
gorical approach to decide the issue, Justice Alito’s dissent asserted 
that the Court did not actually employ a purely categorical ap-
proach.162 If this is true, then Monrieffe might, in effect, support the 
use of a modified categorical approach. Even if Moncrieffe does not 
                                                                                                                       
 157. Moncrieffe, 133 S. Ct. 1678. 
 158. See id. at 1694 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (referring to the “drug trafficking crime” 
statute at issue in Moncrieffe).  
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provide this support, other decisions support a modified categorical 
approach as an extension of the doctrine in favor of the alien. Nijha-
wan, for example, shows a necessity to depart from the categorical 
approach in some cases to consider the facts and circumstances under-
lying the conviction.163 In Nijhawan, the Court drew a line to deter-
mine which offenses require consideration under a different approach:  
The “aggravated felony” statute lists several of its “offenses” in lan-
guage that must refer to generic crimes [such as] . . . “murder, rape, 
or sexual abuse of a minor,” . . . “illicit trafficking in a controlled 
substance,” . . . and “illicit trafficking in firearms or destructive de-
vices.” . . . [H]owever, the “aggravated felony” statute . . . lists cer-
tain other “offenses” using language that almost certainly does not 
refer to generic crimes but refers to specific circumstances.164  
 The INA does not define most of the crimes it labels as aggravated 
felonies; rather, it refers to other statutes or uses everyday terms.165 
Sometimes, it is not clear which crimes are generic for the purposes 
of employing one approach over the other, which may support a uni-
versal adoption of a modified categorical approach instead.166 In 2012, 
the Second Circuit decided Pennant v. Holder, in which the court 
explained that the use of the modified categorical approach involves a 
two-step inquiry: (1) the agency must consider whether the state 
statute is divisible, and (2) “[i]f the statute is divisible, the agency 
must proceed to the second step, ‘consult[ing] the record of conviction 
to ascertain the category of conduct of which the alien was convict-
ed.’ ”167 Divisibility refers to some categories of proscribed conduct 
within the provision that warrants removal.168 Upon this determina-
tion, courts may consider the record of conviction, charging docu-
ment, and plea agreement to shed light onto the circumstances of 
conviction that are necessary to determine whether the crime is ag-
gravated, or whether it is even a felony that warrants removal.169 In 
other words, if it is unclear on the face of the conviction whether the 
noncitizen’s conduct was for an aggravated felony or for serious crim-
inal misconduct, immigration judges should be able to go beyond the 
record of conviction at the outset of immigration proceedings and 
“look to the facts and circumstances underlying an offender’s convic-
tion.”170 This would allow inquiry into the offense itself, rather than 
                                                                                                                       
 163. See Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29, 34 (2009). 
 164. Id. at 37. 
 165. Bennett, supra note 124, at 1720. 
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just the language of the violated statute, which may have misleading 
implications. Although this approach might delay the process, the 
delay is worthwhile given the severity of the potential consequences 
for the noncitizen. A modified categorical approach would promote a 
fair determination of whether removal is an appropriate punishment 
for the crime.  
 Although a modified categorical approach may solve the problem 
of less serious offenses being punished too harshly, support for judi-
cial discretion does not suggest that no misdemeanor can equate to 
an aggravated felony. Where the nature of the offense does not con-
stitute a felony and is not aggravated, the judge should have discre-
tion to determine whether the noncitizen is eligible for relief. Yet, in 
certain instances, aggravated felony treatment may be appropriate 
for misdemeanors. For example, in Wireko v. Reno, a misdemeanor 
sexual battery was characterized as an aggravated felony, because it 
fell within the INA’s provision of a crime of violence for which the 
term of imprisonment is at least one year.171 Wireko should be distin-
guished from the shoplifting conviction that was deemed an aggra-
vated felony in Christopher.172 It is more appropriate to categorize 
misdemeanor sexual battery as an aggravated felony, because the 
nature of this crime implies a threat to people. In order to prevent 
serious consequences for all of the crimes included in the expansive 
range of offenses reached by the aggravated felony statute, judges 
should be allowed to order removal for violent crimes or sexually de-
viant crimes as aggravated felonies. However, judges should also 
have the discretion to grant relief in cases where the offenses are 
victimless crimes or nonviolent misdemeanors that pose less serious 
threats to society.  
 Congress should eliminate mandatory removal without first re-
quiring immigration judges to conduct an “individualized inquiry 
that examines factors such as the noncitizen’s length of residence, 
family ties, likelihood of rehabilitation, and conditions in the receiv-
ing country in order to determine whether removal is warranted.”173 
Inquiring into this background information could better protect fami-
ly unity for noncitizens convicted of crimes while ensuring justice. 
Individualized inquiry could also effectively protect the U.S. commu-
nity by requiring removal of noncitizens that pose the most serious 
threats to society.174  
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1194  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:1173 
 
VI.   CONCLUSION 
 The INA is a complex body of law governing the generally confus-
ing area of immigration law. The INA has evolved since its inception 
and continues to face challenges in light of recurring issues. Changes 
to the INA have expanded the classes of offenses that may be catego-
rized as aggravated felonies and eliminated judicial discretion to 
grant relief to noncitizens. Moreover, changes to the INA have lim-
ited the Attorney General’s ability to cancel removal, leaving nonciti-
zens convicted of aggravated felonies in danger of mandatory removal 
with no opportunity for relief. The issue of which crimes constitute 
aggravated felonies has been litigated extensively due to the harsh 
penalties imposed upon those convicted of aggravated felonies. In 
several cases, the Supreme Court realized the harsh consequences of 
this classification and spared some offenses from aggravated felony 
categorization. The Court’s decisions seem to encourage a revision of 
legislative provisions and to improve the current state of immigration 
law in favor of noncitizens. To avoid over-punishment, Congress 
should narrow the classes of crimes that can be reached by the ag-
gravated felony definition, or it should grant immigration judges 
more discretion to consider which offenses appropriately follow the 
letter of the law. The employment of a modified categorical approach 
may be an effective way to balance congressional interests and the 
rights of noncitizens. By allowing judges to inquire about circum-
stances surrounding the conviction and the noncitizen’s background, 
a fair determination may be achieved as to whether or not a convic-
tion warrants characterization as an aggravated felony. 
